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Versions: 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                    SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Updates: 3552 (if approved)                                      I. Arce
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         Quarkslab
Expires: September 1, 2018                             February 28, 2018


 Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in
                           Network Protocols
              draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-02

Abstract

   For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/
   IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with
   effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to
   information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring.
   The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection
   of transient identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of an
   insufficient or misleading specifications.  This document formally
   updates RFC3552, such that RFCs are required to perform a security
   and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers they
   specify.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Issues with the Specification of Identifiers  . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Common Flaws in the Generation of Transient Identifiers . . .   5
   5.  Security and Privacy Requirements for Identifiers . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Network protocols employ a variety of transient numeric identifiers
   for different protocol entities, ranging from DNS Transaction IDs
   (TxIDs) to transport protocol numbers (e.g.  TCP ports) or IPv6
   Interface Identifiers (IIDs).  These identifiers usually have
   specific properties that must be satisfied such that they do not
   result in negative interoperability implications (e.g. uniqueness
   during a specified period of time), and associated failure severities
   when such properties are not met.

   For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/
   IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with
   effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to
   information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring
   [RFC7528].  The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the
   poor selection of identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result
   of an insufficient or misleading specification.  While it is
   generally trivial to identify an algorithm that can satisfy the
   interoperability requirements for a given identifier, there exists
   practical evidence that doing so without negatively affecting the




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   security and/or privacy properties of the aforementioned protocols is
   prone to error.

   For example, implementations have been subject to security and/or
   privacy issues resulting from:

   o  Predictable TCP sequence numbers

   o  Predictable transport protocol numbers

   o  Predictable IPv4 or IPv6 Fragment Identifiers

   o  Predictable IPv6 IIDs

   o  Predictable DNS TxIDs

   Recent history indicates that when new protocols are standardized or
   new protocol implementations are produced, the security and privacy
   properties of the associated identifiers tend to be overlooked and
   inappropriate algorithms to generate identifier values are either
   suggested in the specification or selected by implementators.  As a
   result, we believe that advice in this area is warranted.

2.  Terminology

   Identifier:
      A data object in a protocol specification that can be used to
      definetely distinguish a protocol object (a datagram, network
      interface, transport protocol endpoint, session, etc) from all
      other objects of the same type, in a given context.  Identifiers
      are usually defined as a series of bits and represented using
      integer values.  We note that different identifiers may have
      additional requirements or properties depending on their specific
      use in a protocol.  We use the term "identifier" as a generic term
      to refer to any data object in a protocol specification that
      satisfies the identification property stated above.  Throughout
      this document we refer as "transient network identifiers" (or
      simply as "identifiers") to the identifiers being dynamically
      selected by a protocol.  Our use of "identifier" excludes static
      values such as "Protocol Numbers" and the like.

   Failure Severity:
      The consequences of a failure to comply with the interoperability
      requirements of a given identifier.  Severity considers the worst
      potential consequence of a failure, determined by the system
      damage and/or time lost to repair the failure.  In this document
      we define two types of failure severity: "soft" and "hard".




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   Hard Failure:
      A hard failure is a non-recoverable condition in which a protocol
      does not operate in the prescribed manner or it operates with
      excessive degradation of service.  For example, an established TCP
      connection that is aborted due to an error condition constitutes,
      from the point of view of the transport protocol, a hard failure,
      since it enters a state from which normal operation cannot be
      recovered.

   Soft Failure:
      A soft failure is a recoverable condition in which a protocol does
      not operate in the prescribed manner but normal operation can be
      resumed automatically in a short period of time.  For example, a
      simple packet-loss event that is subsequently recovered with a
      retransmission can be considered a soft failure.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Issues with the Specification of Identifiers

   While assessing protocol specifications and implementations regarding
   the use of transient numeric identifiers, we found that most of the
   issues discussed in this document arise as a result of one of the
   following:

   o  Protocol specifications which under-specify the requirements for
      their identifiers

   o  Protocol specifications that over-specify their identifiers

   o  Protocol implementations that simply fail to comply with the
      specified requirements

   A number of protocol implementations (too many of them) simply
   overlook the security and privacy implications of identifiers.
   Examples of them are the specification of TCP port numbers in
   [RFC0793], the specification of TCP sequence numbers in [RFC0793], or
   the specification of the DNS TxID in [RFC1035].

   On the other hand, there are a number of protocol specifications that
   over-specify some of their associated protocol identifiers.  For
   example, [RFC4291] essentially results in link-layer addresses being
   embedded in the IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs) when the
   interoperability requirement of uniqueness could be achieved in other
   ways that do not result in negative security and privacy implications
   [RFC7721].  Similarly, [RFC2460] suggests the use of a global counter



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   for the generation of Fragment Identification values, when the
   interoperability properties of uniqueness per {Src IP, Dst IP} could
   be achieved with other algorithms that do not result in negative
   security and privacy implications.

   Finally, there are protocol implementations that simply fail to
   comply with existing protocol specifications.  For example, some
   popular operating systems (notably Microsoft Windows) still fail to
   implement randomization of transport protocol ephemeral ports, as
   specified in [RFC6056].

   By requiring protocol specifications to clearly specify the
   interoperability requirements for the transient numeric identifiers
   they specify, the constraints in the possible algorithms to generate
   them, as well as possible over-specification of such identifiers,
   become evident.  Furthermore, requiring specifications to include a
   security and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers
   they specify prevents the corresponding considerations from being
   overlooked at the time a protocol is specified.

4.  Common Flaws in the Generation of Transient Identifiers

   This section briefly notes common flaws associated with the
   generation of transient numeric identifiers.  Such common flaws
   include, but are not limited to:

   o  Employing trivial algorithms (e.g. global counters) that result in
      predictable identifiers

   o  Employing the same identifier across contexts in which constancy
      is not required

   o  Re-using identifiers across different protocols or layers of the
      protocol stack

   o  Initializing counters or timers to constant values, when such
      initialization is not required

   o  Employing the same increment space across different contexts

   o  Use of flawed PRNGs.

   Employing trivial algorithms for generating the identifiers means
   that any node that is able to sample the aforementioned identifier
   can easily predict future identifiers employed by the victim node.
   For example, the algorithm for Fragment Identification selection in
   [RFC2460] and the algorithm for TCP ISN selection in [RFC0793].




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   When one identifier is employed across contexts where such constancy
   is not needed, activity correlation is made made possible.  For
   example, [RFC4291] essentially results in link-layer addresses being
   embedded in the IPv6 Interface Identifiers (IIDs) when the
   interoperability requirement of uniqueness could be achieved in other
   ways.  Employing an identifier that is constant across networks
   allows for node tracking across networks.

   Re-using identifiers across different layers or protocols ties the
   security and privacy of the protocol re-using the identifier to the
   security and privacy properties of such identifier (over which the
   protocol re-using the identifier may have no control regarding its
   generation).  Besides, when re-using an identifier across protocols
   from different layer, this breaks the goal of layers of isolating the
   properties of a layer from that of another layer.  The reuse of link-
   layer addresses in IPv6 addresses specified in [RFC4291] is one
   example of that.

   At times, a protocol needs to convey order information (whether
   sequence, timing, etc.).  In many cases, there is no reason for the
   corresponding counter or timer to be initialized to any specific
   value e.g. at system bootstrap.  For example, an implementations that
   employs a counter for the Fragment Identifier [RFC2460] that gets
   initialized to zero upon system bootstrapping will leak the amount of
   fragmented traffic that this node has transmitted.  Similarly, a node
   that updates a timer to zero when bootstrapping will reveal the
   "uptime" of the node.

   When a node that implements a per-context linear function may share
   the increment space among different contexts (please see the "Simple
   Hash-Based Algorithm" in [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids]).
   Sharing the same increment space allows an attacker that can sample
   identifiers in other context to e.g. learn how many identifiers have
   been generated between two sampled values.  [Sanfilippo1998a] and
   [Sanfilippo1998b] employ shared increment spaces to leak the amount
   of fragmented traffic that has been transmitted by a target node.

   Finally, some implementations have been found to emply flawed PRNGs.
   See e.g.[Klein2007].

5.  Security and Privacy Requirements for Identifiers

   Protocol specifications that specify transient numeric identifiers
   MUST:

   1.  Clearly specify the interoperability requirements for the
       aforementioned identifiers.




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   2.  Provide a security and privacy analysis of the aforementioned
       identifiers.

   3.  Recommend an algorithm for generating the aforementioned
       identifiers that mitigates security and privacy issues, such as
       those discussed in [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids].

6.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA registries within this document.  The RFC-Editor
   can remove this section before publication of this document as an
   RFC.

7.  Security Considerations

   The entire document is about the security and privacy implications of
   transient numeric identifiers, and formally updates [RFC3552] such
   that the "Security Considerations" sections of RFCs are required to
   perform a security and privacy analysis of the numeric identifiers
   they specify.

8.  Acknowledgements

   This document is based on the document
   [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids] co-authored by Fernando Gont and
   Ivan Arce.  Thus, the authors would like to thank (in alphabetical
   order) Steven Bellovin, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Gre Norcie, for
   providing valuable comments on that document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.






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   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC6056]  Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-
              Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6056, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6056>.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.

   [RFC6528]  Gont, F. and S. Bellovin, "Defending against Sequence
              Number Attacks", RFC 6528, DOI 10.17487/RFC6528, February
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6528>.

   [RFC7098]  Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and W. Tarreau, "Using the IPv6
              Flow Label for Load Balancing in Server Farms", RFC 7098,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7098, January 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7098>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.gont-predictable-numeric-ids]
              Gont, F. and I. Arce, "Security and Privacy Implications
              of Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols",
              draft-gont-predictable-numeric-ids-01 (work in progress),
              July 2017.

   [Klein2007]
              Klein, A., "OpenBSD DNS Cache Poisoning and Multiple O/S
              Predictable IP ID Vulnerability", 2007,
              <http://www.trusteer.com/files/OpenBSD_DNS_Cache_Poisoning
              _and_Multiple_OS_Predictable_IP_ID_Vulnerability.pdf>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.





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   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC7528]  Higgs, P. and J. Piesing, "A Uniform Resource Name (URN)
              Namespace for the Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV (HbbTV)
              Association", RFC 7528, DOI 10.17487/RFC7528, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7528>.

   [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

   [Sanfilippo1998a]
              Sanfilippo, S., "about the ip header id", Post to Bugtraq
              mailing-list, Mon Dec 14 1998,
              <http://seclists.org/bugtraq/1998/Dec/48>.

   [Sanfilippo1998b]
              Sanfilippo, S., "Idle scan", Post to Bugtraq mailing-list,
              1998, <http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/papers/dumbscan.html>.

Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706
   Argentina

   Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
   Email: fgont@si6networks.com
   URI:   http://www.si6networks.com


   Ivan Arce
   Quarkslab

   Email: iarce@quarkslab.com
   URI:   https://www.quarkslab.com






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