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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                       D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                               lispers.net
Intended status: Experimental                                E. Nordmark
Expires: April 20, 2018                                           Zededa
                                                        October 17, 2017


       LISP Control-Plane ECDSA Authentication and Authorization
                   draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01

Abstract

   This draft describes how LISP control-plane messages can be
   individually authenticated and authorized without a a priori shared-
   key configuration.  Public-key cryptography is used with no new PKI
   infrastructure required.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Public-Key Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Hash-EID Mapping Entry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Hash-EID Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Keys and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Signed Map-Register Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Signed Map-Request Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Other Uses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.1.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01.txt . . . .  11
     B.2.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00.txt . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The LISP architecture and protocols [RFC6830] introduces two new
   numbering spaces, Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators
   (RLOCs) which provide an architecture to build overlays on top of the
   underlying Internet.  Mapping EIDs to RLOC-sets is accomplished with
   a Mapping Database System.  EIDs and RLOCs come in many forms than
   just IP addresses, using a general syntax that includes Address
   Family Identifier (AFI) [RFC1700].  Not only IP addresses, but other
   addressing information have privacy requirements.  Access to private
   information is granted only to those who are authorized and
   authenticated.  Using asymmetric keying with public key cryptography
   enforces authentication for entities that read from and write to the
   mapping system.  The proposal described in this document takes
   advantage of the latest in Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

   In this proposal the EID is derived from a public key, and the
   corresponding private key is used to authenticate and authorize Map-
   Register messages.  Thus only the owner of the corresponding private
   key can create and update entries for that EID.  Furthermore, the
   same approach is used to authenticate Map-Request messages.  This in
   combination with the mapping database containing authorization
   information for Map-Requests is used to restrict which EIDs can
   lookup up the RLOCs for another EID.




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   This specification introduces how to use the Distinguished-Name AFI
   [AFI] and the [RFC8060] LCAF JSON Type to encode public keys and
   signatures in the LISP mapping database.  The information in the
   mapping database is used to verify cryptographic signatures in LISP
   control-plane messages such as the Map-Request and Map-Register.































2.  Definition of Terms

   Crypto-EID:  is an IPv6 EID where part of the EID includes a hash
      value of a public-key.  An IPv6 EID is a Crypto-EID when the Map-
      Server is configured with an Crypto-EID Prefix that matches the
      IPv6 EID.

   Crypto-EID Hash Length:  is the number of low-order bits in a Crypto-
      EID which make up the hash of a public-key.  The hash length is
      determined by the Map-Server when it is configured with a Crypto-
      EID Prefix.




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   Crypto-EID Prefix:  is a configuration parameter on the Map-Server
      that indicates which IPv6 EIDs are Crypto-EIDs and what is the
      Crypto-EID Hash Length for the IPv6 EID.  This can be different
      for different LISP Instance-IDs.

   Hash-EID:  is a distinguished name EID-record stored in the mapping
      database.  The EID format is 'hash-<pubkey-hash>'.  When a key-
      pair is generated for an endpoint, the produced private-key does
      not leave the xTR that will register the Crypto-EID.  A hash of
      the public-key is used to produce a Crypto-EID and a Hash-EID.
      The Crypto-EID is assigned to the endpoint and the xTR that
      supports the LISP-site registers the Crypto-EID.  Another entity
      registers the Hash-EID mapping with the public-key as an RLOC-
      record.

   Public-Key RLOC:  is a JSON string that encodes a public-key as an
      RLOC-record for a Hash-EID mapping entry.  The format of the JSON
      string is '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey>" }'.

   Control-Plane Signature:  a Map-Request or Map-Register sender signs
      the message with its private key.  The format of the signature is
      a JSON string that includes sender information and the signature
      value.  The JSON string is included in Map-Request and Map-
      Register messages.



























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3.  Overview

   LISP already has several message authentication mechanisms.  They can
   be found in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], and
   [RFC8061].  The mechanisms in this draft are providing a more
   granular level of authentication as well as a simpler way to manage
   keys and passwords.

   A client of the mapping system can be authenticated using public-key
   cryptography.  The client is required to have a private/public key-
   pair where it uses the private-key to sign Map-Requests and Map-
   Registers.  The server, or the LISP entity, that processes Map-
   Requests and Map-Registers uses the public-key to verify signatures.

   The following describes how the mapping system is used to implement
   the public-key crypto system:

   1.  An entity registers Hash-EID to Public-Key RLOC mappings.  A
       third-party entity that provides a service can register or the
       client itself can register.

   2.  Anyone can lookup the Hash-EID mappings.  These mappings are not
       usually authenticated with the mechanisms in this draft but use
       the shared configured password mechanisms from
       [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] that provide group level
       authentication.

   3.  When a Crypto-EID is registered to the mapping system, a
       signature is included in the Map-Register message.

   4.  The Map-Server processes the registration by constructing the
       Hash-EID from the registered Crypto-EID, looks up the Hash-EID in
       the mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record
       and verifies the signature.  If Hash-EID lookup fails or the
       signature verification fails, the Map-Register is not accepted.

   5.  When a Crypto-EID is looked up in the mapping system, a signature
       is included with a signer-EID in the Map-Request message.

   6.  The Map-Server processes the request for a Crypto-EID by
       constructing the Hash-EID from the signer-EID included in the
       Map-Request.  The signer-EID is a Crypto-EID that accompanies a
       signature in the Map-Request.  The Hash-EID is looked up in the
       mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record and
       verifies the Map-Request signature.  If the Hash-EID lookup fails
       or the signature verification fails, the Map-Request is not
       accepted and a Negative Map-Reply is sent back with an action of
       "auth-failure".



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4.  Public-Key Hash

   When a private/public key-pair is created for a node, its IPv6 EID is
   pre-determined based on the public key generated.  Note if the key-
   pair is compromised or is changed for the node, a new IPv6 EID is
   assigned for the node.

   The sha256 [RFC6234] hex digest function is used to compute the hash.
   The hash is run over the following hex byte string:

   <iid><prefix><pubkey>

   Where each field is defined to be:

   <iid>:  is a 4-byte (leading zeroes filled) binary value of the
      Instance-ID the EID will be registered with in the mapping
      database.  For example, if the instance-id is 171, then the 4-byte
      value is 0x000000ab.

   <prefix>:  is a variable length IPv6 prefix in binary format (with no
      colons) and IS quad-nibble zero-filled.  The length of the prefix
      is 128 minus the Crypto-EID hash bit length.  For example, if the
      prefix is 2001:5:3::/48, then the 6 byte value is 0x200100050003.

   <pubkey>:  is a DER [RFC7468] encoded public-key.

   The public-key hash is used to construct the Crypto-EID and Hash-EID.

5.  Hash-EID Mapping Entry

   A Hash-EID is formatted in an EID-record as a Distinguished-Name AFI
   as specified in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding].  The format of
   the string is:

   EID-record: 'hash-<hash-eid>'

   Where <hash-eid> is a public-key hash as described in Section 4.  The
   RLOC-record to encode and store the public-key is in LCAF JSON Type
   format of the form:

   RLOC-record: '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey-base64>" }'

   Where <pubkey-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the public-
   key generated for the system that is assigned the Hash-EID.







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6.  Hash-EID Structure

   Since the Hash-EID is formatted as a distinguished-name AFI, the
   format of the <hash-eid> for EID 'hash-<hash-eid>' needs to be
   specified.  The format will be an IPv6 address [RFC3513] where colons
   are used between quad-nibble characters when the hash bit length is a
   multiple of 4.  And when the hash bit length is not a multiple of 4
   but a multiple of 2, a leading 2 character nibble-pair is present.
   Here are some examples for different hash bit lengths:

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5::1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 64:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5::11:22:33:44, hash length 64:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-0011:0022:0033:0044'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 80:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 72:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bb:1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:22:33:4444, hash length 72:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bb:1111:0022:0033:4444'

   Note when leading zeroes exist in a IPv6 encoded quad between colons,
   the zeros are included in the quad for the Hash-EID string.

   The entity that creates the hash, the entity that registers the
   Crypto-EID and the Map-Server that uses the hash for Hash-EID lookups
   MUST agree on the hash bit length.

7.  Keys and Signatures

   Key generation, message authentication with digital signatures, and
   signature verification will use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
   Algorithm or ECDSA [X9.62].  For key generation curve 'NIST256p' is
   used and recommended.

   Signatures are computed over signature data that depends on the type
   of LISP message sent.  See Section 8 and Section 9 for each message
   type.  The signature data is passed through a sha256 hash function
   before it is signed or verified.








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8.  Signed Map-Register Encoding

   When a ETR registers its Crypto-EID to the mapping system, it builds
   a LISP Map-Register message.  The mapping includes an EID-record
   which encodes the IPv6 Crypto-EID and an RLOC-set.  One of the RLOC-
   records in the RLOC-set includes the the ETR's signature.  The RLOC-
   record is formatted with a LCAF JSON Type, in the following format:

   { "signature" : <signature-base64>" }

   Where <signature-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded string over
   the following ascii [RFC0020] string signature data:

   [<iid>]<crypto-eid>

   Where <iid> is the decimal value of the instance-ID the Crypto-EID is
   registering to and the <crypto-eid> is in the form of [RFC3513] where
   quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.

   The Map-Server that process an EID-record with a Crypto-EID and a
   RLOC-record with a signature extracts the public-key hash value from
   the Crypto-EID to build a Hash-EID.  The Map-Server looks up the
   Hash-EID in the mapping system to obtain the public-key RLOC-record.
   The Map-Server verifies the signature over the signature data to
   determine if it should accept the EID-record registration.

9.  Signed Map-Request Encoding

   When an xTR (an ITR, PITR, or RTR), sends a Map-Request to the
   mapping system to request the RLOC-set for a Crypto-EID, it signs the
   Map-Request so it can authenticate itself to the Map-Server the
   Crypto-EID is registered to.  The Map-Request target-EID field will
   contain the Crypto-EID and the source-EID field will contain an LCAF
   JSON Type string with the following signature information:

   { "source-eid" : "<seid>", "signature-eid" : "<signer-eid>",
     "signature" : "<signature-base64>" }

   Where <seid> and <signer-eid> are IPv6 encoded strings according to
   [RFC3513] where quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.  The
   <seid> is the source EID from the data packet that is invoking the
   Map-Request or the entire key/value pair for "source-eid" can be
   excluded when a data packet did not invoke the Map-Request (i.e. lig
   or an API request).  The <signer-eid> is the IPv6 Crypto-EID of the
   xTR that is providing the Map-Request signature.

   The signature string <signature-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded
   string over the following signature data:



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   <nonce><source-eid><crypto-eid>

   Where <nonce> is a hex string [RFC0020] of the nonce used in the Map-
   Request and the <source-eid> and <crypto-eid> are hex strings
   [RFC0020] of an IPv6 address in the form of [RFC3513] where quad-
   nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.  When <seid> is not
   included in the Map-Request, string "0::0" is used for <source-eid>.

10.  Other Uses

   The mechanisms described within this document can be used to sign
   other types of LISP messages.  And for further study is how to use
   these mechanisms to sign LISP encapsulated data packets in a
   compressed manner to reduce data packet header overhead.

   In addition to authenticating other types of LISP messages, other
   types of EID-records can be encoded as well and is not limited to
   IPv6 EIDs.  It is possible for a LISP xTR to register and request non
   IPv6 EIDs but use IPv6 Crypto-EIDs for the sole purpose of signing
   and verifying EID-records.

11.  Security Considerations

   The mechanisms within this specification are intentionally using
   accepted practices and state of the art public-key cryptography.

   Crypto-EIDs can be made private when control messages are encrypted,
   for instance, using [RFC8061].

   The topological or physical location of a Crypto-EID is only
   available to the other Crypto-EIDs that register in the same LISP
   Instance-ID and have their corresponding Hash-EIDs registered.

   This draft doesn't address reply attacks directly.  If a man-in-the-
   middle captures Map-Register messages, it could send such captured
   packets at a later time which contains signatures of the source.  In
   which case, the Map-Server verifies the signature as good and
   interprets the contents to be valid where in fact the contents can
   contain old mapping information.  This problem can be solved by
   encrypting the contents of Map-Registers using a third-party protocol
   like DTLS [RFC6347] or LISP-Crypto [RFC8061] directly by
   encapsulating Map-Registers in LISP data packets (using port 4341).

12.  IANA Considerations

   Since there are no new packet formats introduced for the
   functionality in this specification, there are no specific requests
   for IANA.



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13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0020]  Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
              RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.

   [RFC1700]  Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1700, October 1994,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1700>.

   [RFC3513]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6) Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3513, April 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3513>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6830]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
              Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>.

   [RFC6833]  Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
              Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6833>.

   [RFC7468]  Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
              PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
              April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.

   [RFC8060]  Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format (LCAF)", RFC 8060, DOI 10.17487/RFC8060,
              February 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8060>.




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   [RFC8061]  Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol
              (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8061>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [AFI]      IANA, "Address Family Identifier (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBERS http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-
              numbers/address-family-numbers.xhtml?, Febuary 2007.

   [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding]
              Farinacci, D., "LISP Distinguished Name Encoding", draft-
              farinacci-lisp-name-encoding-04 (work in progress),
              September 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]
              Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., and A. Cabellos-Aparicio,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Control-Plane",
              draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis-06 (work in progress), October
              2017.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]
              Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.
              Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-13
              (work in progress), September 2017.

   [X9.62]    American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
              Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
              Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
              NIST ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   A special thanks goes to Sameer Merchant for his ideas and technical
   contributions to the ideas in this draft.

Appendix B.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.]

B.1.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01.txt

   o  Draft posted October 2017.

   o  Make it more clear what values and format the EID hash is run
      over.




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   o  Update references to newer RFCs and Internet Drafts.

B.2.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00.txt

   o  Initial draft posted July 2017.

Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   lispers.net
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: farinacci@gmail.com


   Erik Nordmark
   Zededa
   Santa Clara, CA
   USA

   Email: erik@zededa.com





























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